Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and his escape from Syria, and the assumption of Ahmad al-Sharaa to the presidency of the transitional phase for five years—through a meeting of the factions allied with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in the “The Syrian opposition offensive” operation, the announcement of the “Victory Conference,” and his self-appointment as President of the Republic with nearly absolute legislative and executive powers, as well as the appointment of Asaad al-Shaybani as Minister of Foreign Affairs—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has become the political and diplomatic face of the state, its spokesperson, and the entity that reflects its political and economic orientations.

Its activity became evident in the first weeks of assuming power in Damascus, where foreign visits intensified in accordance with the importance of each relationship and its influence on the fate of the new authority. It began with the neighboring regional countries—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Jordan, Turkey—and then extended to several European countries to attend various conferences. These visits were crowned with the transitional president’s trip to France at the invitation of President Emmanuel Macron, then to Russia, and finally to the United States of America.

It was clear that the new leaders were attempting to convince regional states and international actors involved in the Syrian file that a shift had occurred in their thinking—moving from a Salafi-jihadist ideology toward a worldview more open to the world, abandoning their previous project of establishing an Islamic state (as reflected in ISIS slogans or those of other Salafi-jihadist organizations). However, this shift was not reflected internally, where sectarian and retaliatory practices were witnessed; the most violent among them were the sectarian massacres in Homs, Hama, the coastal region, and later in Suwayda in southern Syria.

They also adopted an open market economy based on competition and acceptance of all types of foreign investment without setting priorities for production, for the role of external investment in the Syrian economy, or for its impact on the Syrian economy and the interests of Syria and its citizens. What mattered most to them was breaking from what remained of socialist laws and pursuing the privatization of the public sector.

Politically, their orientations have not yet crystallized—whether nationalist or a form of moderate religious ideology. But what was clear was their distancing from and hostility toward Baathist concepts surrounding the Arab national question, Arab unity, the Palestinian cause, democracy, secularism, and anything related to anti-Ottoman thought—along with their hostility toward the Islamic Republic of Iran and its sectarian and political extensions.

To understand the behavior of this authority, it is important to understand the circumstances that led to its rise to power, which took place before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime—especially the American, British, Israeli, Turkish, and Qatari understandings, some of whose features we can discern: cutting ties with the Iranians, expelling Hezbollah and the Popular Mobilization Forces from Syria, ending hostility toward Israel and avoiding confrontation with it, and cooperating with the international coalition led by the United States against ISIS. There may also be many other secret, undisclosed agreements.

Thus, Al-Sharaa’s visit on November 4, 2025, is based on this set of preexisting conditions and the announcement of several understandings agreed upon before his arrival in Washington. The visit began with the “gift” of removing the names of Damascus leaders from global terrorism lists, followed by the announcement of Damascus joining the coalition against ISIS and other jihadist forces, and the continued rehabilitation of Syria’s new president, portraying global confidence and a willingness to help him overcome political and economic obstacles—especially those related to Syria’s reconstruction.

When examining the visit, one must recall the sanctions file. The United States imposed numerous sanctions on Syria, the most notable of which is the Caesar Act, which restricts economic dealings with Damascus. The leaders in Damascus, with the help of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, are now seeking to lift these sanctions as a necessary step for reconstruction. Meanwhile, Washington insists on certain conditions before suspending the Caesar Act, mainly due to issues of trust in the new leadership regarding Islamist terrorism, the stability of Syria, protection of minorities, and the integration of the SDF into the Syrian state.

Another likely goal of the visit is to reintegrate Syria regionally and internationally. The visit—which came with significant media support—represents a diplomatic shift from isolation to dialogue and an attempt to create new partnerships, including counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence coordination. It is also an attempt by Al-Sharaa to benefit from international recognition—particularly from the United States—by expressing his desire for stability and for resolving old local tensions, especially in northeastern and southern Syria.

However, the key question remains: Was the visit beneficial to the Syrian people, or was it beneficial to the new leadership in Syria? This brings us back to the role of the United States and its interests in the region. There is no doubt that the United States has expanded its influence in the region at the expense of Russia’s declining role, becoming increasingly able to assert political and military control in the face of China and Russia—especially since this is a U.S. priority that precedes economic gains, particularly in light of the global power struggle highlighted by the war in Ukraine.

This confirms that the region’s regimes have accepted explicit and clear U.S. hegemony over all Gulf states, the Middle East, North and Central Africa, and Central Asia, placing China under military encirclement as a prelude to economic containment. The global situation is undergoing a process of repositioning, or as described in political literature, a re-division of markets, sources of raw materials, and political and military spheres of influence.

In this broader context, Syria is part of the larger American project and works to maintain its stability insofar as it serves U.S. and Israeli interests. We can already observe significant—sometimes conditional—facilitations aimed at stabilizing the new authority and assisting it in resolving internal problems, especially concerning the SDF and southern Syria, as well as combating extremist forces seeking control.

We must not forget that the Syrian people need stability—even conditional stability—after this long period of civil war, the destruction of all state and societal capacities, and their descent into extreme poverty and displacement. Realistically, the Syrian people cannot engage in genuine political action against U.S. or Israeli violations, or against any internal authoritarian rule, nor can they build the homeland they dream of—a state of citizenship—without stability, reconstruction, and economic development. Today, we urgently need to combat poverty, secure the return of displaced persons, and improve infrastructure.

As for the transitional authority, this is a major opportunity to demonstrate its desire for stability, state-building, extending control, ensuring security, and doing what is necessary to improve people’s economic conditions. There is no doubt that delicate internal and external balances govern its conduct, and this requires the participation of all patriotic Syrians to push toward making this offered opportunity a genuine one—one that includes a true national dialogue between all components of the Syrian people, leading to reconciliation and an expanded national government that prepares the groundwork for clear steps toward stability, opens the space for forming political parties, ends reliance on civil war solutions, and transitions toward political action in its recognized forms.

The Political Committee

Syrian Women’s Political Movement